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CONSTITUTIONAL-LAW IN l91g-1920"
A REVIEW
OF THE
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
'
.
THE UNITE:p STATES ON CONSTITUIONAL QUESTIONS
DURING T~ OCTOBER TERM, 1919
r~~ew

co~stitutional

aims to include all the, decisions on
T HIS
questions renderc:d
the Supreme Court of the United States

by
during the October Tenn of cot;trt which began in October, 1919, and
ended. in June, 1920.1 The treatment for the most part contents i~self

* ThiS is the first of ~ series of three papers on this fopic. The others
will appear in succeeding issue!.
·
·
1
Similar reviews of decisions from 1914 to 1919 have appeared in the
AKtl!ICAN PotI'l'ICAL ScxtNCS IU:vntw, XII, 17-49. 427-457, 64<>-066, XIII,
47-77, ~250, fio7-633, and XIV, 53-13· That journal plans to continue to
review each year the more important decisions of the Supreme Court. It
also "publishes lli ·nearly every issue a review called "Judicial DecisiOns on
- .t>ublic Law." Recent ones by Robert E. Cushmin will be found in volume
XI, pp. 545-555, 7:»-730, volume XII, pp. 95-105, :l//2-~7. 475-488, 685-694.
volume XIII, pp. 100-107, ~1-292, 451-459, and volume XIV, pp. 303-316,
461-470. In the Record of Political Events published as a supplement to each
September issue of the POI.I'tlCAL SCIENCS Qu.AR'l'JUU,Y is a section called "The
Federal Judiciary" which summarizes briefly the important decisions of the
Supreme Court during the preceding year. In 35 Pot. Sex. QuART. 4n, is an
article called "The Supreme Court and the Constitution, 1919-1920," which
reviews the important decisions of the past year. The QuARttRLY plans to
publish similar articles in each September issue. In the AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, volume VI, pp. 22-33, is a "Review of Recent Supreme
Court Decisions" by S. S. Gregory, dealing with selected decisions. It is announced that similar reviews will·be contained in the succeeding issues. Each
issue of the ButLJ>TIN OJ! TH!> NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION contains a department called "Decisions and Rulings" which reviews a large number of decisions on ~tion. This is not confined to decisions of the Supreme Court.
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with exposition. The footnotes give referen<:es to articles and editorial notes in recognized law journals commenting on the cases here
reviewed and on the more important constitutional decisions of other
<:ourts.2 The classification of the cases and the arrangement of
topics are not satisfactory, but no alternative seems distinctly superior. A classification on the basis oI the clauses of the Constitution under which the cases arise would have decided demerits. Under
the Fourte~th Amendment we should have to jumble together complaints against judicial procedure, tax laws, police measures, exercises of eminent domain and other. governmental action. It seems
preferable to follow established distinctions between various governmental powers and to· let them set the plan for 'the main structure
of the classification.
·

I. Mxscm:,r,AN:Eous NA'l'IONAI, Pow:r:RS
.The validity and the effect of the Eighteenth Amendment8 was
passed upon in two cases. Hawke v. Smith4t. decided that a state
Beginning with volume 33, the· HARVARD LAW Rimtw contains a series of
.articles called. ''The. Progress of the Law'', written by professors in the Harvard Law School. Cases on police pawer and administrative law will'be found
in Beale, ''Municipal Corporations" (XXX:ill, 1058) ; cases on taxation in
'Beale, "Conflict of Laws" (XXXIII, I), and Warren, "Wills and· Administration" (~III, 556) ; and cases on "the jurisdiction and procedure of
~urts in Beale, "Conflict of Laws"· (XXXIII, I), and Scott, "Civil PrO"cedure" (XXXIII, :zJ()).
·
~
·
2
It is intended to include references to all articles and notes in law journals which deal with any question of public law. References given without
introduction are to discussions of the case considered in the text. For· refer·ence to articles in other than technical law journals, the issues of the AxtRI.cAN EcoNoo.tic Rimtw, AYIUUCAN HisTORICAJ. Rim:Ew, and AMJUUCAN Por.rr'ICAJ. SCitNcr: Rtmw should be consulted. Each issue of these reviews contains a list of articles in periodicals, a considerable number of which have to
<lo with matters out of which spring issues of constitutional law.
• "Section l. After Qne year from the ratification of this article the man11facture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation
thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes ·is hereby
i>rohibited.
Section :z. The Congress and the several states shall. have concurrent
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
•:z53 U. S. - - , 40 Sup. Ct. 495 (1920). See also Hawke v. Smith, 253
U.S.. - - , 40 Sup. Ct. 4g8 (1920), applying the same ptjnciple to the Suffrage
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constitution cannot authorize a referendum to the electorate from the
action of .a state legislature in ratifying an amendment to the federal
Constitution. The power to ratify was said to have its source
in the federal Constitution. The Fifth Article which provides for
amendntents is a grant of authority by the people to· Congress. Congress is resttk~ed to the choice between t.wo methods of ratification.
It ·may send an amendment to state legislatur.es or to state conventions. When the Constitution uses the term "state le~slature" it
means the representative law-making body and not the general electorate. What. the term meant when the Constitution was adopted, it
means still. The argument that the Constitution looks to ratification
by legislative action in the states is unsound. "Ratification by a
state of a constitutional amen~ent is not an act of legislation within
the proper sense of the word. It is but the expression of the assent
of the state to a proposed amendment." Legislatures get their authority to ratify,. not from the people of the state, but through the
grant to Congress ·by the people of the United States. A qse5 which
allowed a state with the assent of Congress to apply the referendum
to an act of the state legislature fixing the boundaries .of congressional districts was said to be inapposite, since such action is legislative in character while th~ ratification of an amendment is not. "The
choice of means of ratification was wisely withheld from conflicting
action in the several states." .Otherwise there might be "endless
confusion in the manner of ratification of federal amendment$.'' It
is apparent that what Mr. Justice Day says about the referendum
is applkable to other state attempts to restrict state legislatures in
ratifying amendments to the federal Constitution, and that the Tennessee fogislature was justified in acting on the Nineteenth Amend-·
ment in disregard of the requirement of the Tennessee constitution
that an election of members of the legislature must intervene between
Amendment. See 91 Cr:N'l'. L. J. 1. For discussions of the referendum question prior to the Supreme Court decision, see William Howard Taft, "Can
Ratification of an Amendment to the Constitution Be Made to Depend on a
.Referendum?", 28 YAI.~ L. J. 821, and notes in 8 CAI.IF. L. Rtv. 185, 8g Clw'l'.
L ..J., 334 19 Cor.m.r. L. Rt\r. 502, 4 CoRNSLL L. Q. 195, 33 HARv. L. Rtv. 287,
'23 LAw Nons 62, 102, u9, 24 LAW Nons 64. 4 MAss. L. Q. 236, 342, and
18 M1c:a:. L. Rtv. 51, 6g8. Some of the discussions cited in note 6, infra., also.
consider the referendum question.
'Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 36 Sup. Ct. 7o8 (1916).

4
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the submission of a proposed amendment by Congress afid its consideration by the state legislature.
The Eighteenth Amendment as a whole was sustained in Rhode
Island v. Palmer.6 The court introduced a novelty into its practice
by contenting itself with a statement of its conclusions and refrain··
ing from giving its reasons. This is often done in so-called memorandum opi~ons, but these have heretofore been confined to questions of minor importance or to issues already well settled. The
validity of the Amendment was contested on the ground of alleged
defects in the methods of its submission and __ adoption and on tlie
basis of objections to its substance. Hawke v. Smith1 was cited for
the affirmation of the court that a state cannot apply a referendum
•253 U.S.--, 40 Sup. Ct. 486 (1920). See 91 Citm.•. L. J. I. For discussions of the validity of the Amendment prior to the Supreme Court decisions, see Everett V. Abbott, "Inalienable Rights and the Eighteenth Amendment'', 20 Cor.ui.r. L. Rm>. 183, Lucilius A. Emery, "The Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States", 13 M.AINt L. Rm>. 121, William
L. Frierson, "Amending the Constitution of the United States", 33 HARV. L.
Rltv. 659, Frank W. Grinnell, ''Limitations on the Kind of Amendments to the
Federal Constitution Provided for by Article V", 5 MASS. L. Q. II6, Fred B.
Hart, "The Amendatory Power Under the Constitution, Particularly with
Reference to Amendment 18", go C!tNT. L. J. 229, Howard C. Joyce, "The
Prohibition Amendment as an Encroachment on the Inherent. Rights of the
State!!", 23 LAW N~ 26, William L. Marbury, "The Limitations Upon the
Amending Power", 33 HARv. L. Riv. 223, D. 0. McGovney, "Is the Eighteenth
Amendment Void Because of Its Contents?'', 20 Cor.u:r.r. L. Rltv. 499, Fred
H. Peterson, "Modem Views on Amending the Constitution", 8g C!tNT. L. J.
188, George "D. Slcinner, "Intrinsic Limitations on the Power of Constitutional Amendment'', 18 MICH. L. Rm>. 213, Wayne B. Wheeler, ''The Constitutionality of the Constitution is Not a Justiciable Question'', 90 CitNT.
L. J. 152, Justin DuPratt White, "Is There an Eighteenth Amendment?",
5 Coimnr. L. Q. II3, 23 LAW N~s 188, George Washington Williams, ''What,
if Any, Limitations Are There Upon the Power to Amend the Constitution
of .the United States?", 6 VA. L. RtG. n.s. 161, and notes in 18 MICH. L. Rm>.
I55, 700. For discussions of the interpretation of the second section of the
Amendment see Minor Bronaugh, "Concurrent Jurisdiction", 23 LAWN~
85, 0. K. Cushing, " 'Concurrent Power' in the Eighteenth Amendment'', 8
CAI.IP. ·L. Rm. 205, Wayne B. Wheeler, "Which Definition of 'Concurrent
Power' Will the Supreme Court Choose?", 90 CltNT. L. J. 283. "'Concurrent
Jurisdiction' Not the Same as Concurrent Power'', 22 LAw N~s 107, and
note in 33 HARv. L. Rm'. g68.
Y Note 4. supra,
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to the rejection br ratification of an amendment.· An earlier case8 on
the vote necessary to pass a bill over the President's veto was ad·duced for the decision that an a~endment may be proposed by a
vote of two-thii:ds of the members present in each house, provided
there is a quorum. It is not necessary to have "a vote of two-thirds
of .the entire membership, present and absent." The proposal by
the requisite vote "sufficiently shows that the proposal was deemed
necessary by all who voted for it. An express declaration that they
regarded it as necessary is not essential." The objections urged
against the substance of the. amendment were that it was an "addition" and not an "amendment" because not germane to anything in·
. the original Constitution, that it was legislation and hence improper
for inclusion in· the Constitution, and that it interfered with the
powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment and was a
step. towards the destruction of the federal system ordained by the .
Constitution and therefore not within the amending power. Without
specifying these objections, -the court through Mr. Justice Van
Devanter states succinctly t4at the prohibition provision of the
Amendment is within the amending power, is. now a part of the Constituµon and "must be respected and givep effect the same as other
provisions of that in~trument," is "operative throughout the entire
. territorial limits of the United States" and "of its own force invalidates every legislative Act, whether by Congress, by a state Legislature, or by a territorial assen:ibly, which authorizes or sanctions. what
the section forbids."
The decision on-the.validity of the Amendment·was unanimous.
Mr: Justice McReynolds concurred in the disposition of the· cases,
but declined to express himself on the effect of the· amendment on
.. the power of the s~tes. Mr. Justice McKenna went further and
disagreed with the interpretation of the Amendment announced by
the majority. This interpretation was put by Mr. Justice Van
Devanter as follows:
"The second section of the amendment-the one declaring
'The Congress and the several states sb.all have concurrent
power to enforce this article by _appropriate legislation'-does
'Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Kansas, 248 U. S. 2179, 39 Sup. Ct. 93 (r919).

6
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not enable Congress or the several states to defeat or thwart
t~e prohibition, but only to enforce it by appropriate legislation.
"The words 'concurrent power', in that section, do not mean
joint power, or require that legislation thereunder by Congress, to be effective, shall be approved or sanctioned by the
several states or any of them; nor do they mean that the
power to enforce is divided between Congress and the several
states along the lines which separate or distinguish foreign and
interstate commerce from intra-state affairs.
"The power confided to Congress by that section, while not
exclusive, is territorially coextensive with the proh~bition of
the first section, embraces manufacture and other intrastate
transactions as well as importation, exportation and interstate
traffic, and is in no wise dependent on or affected by action or
inaction on the part of the several states or any of them."
The Chief Justice, in a separate concurring opinion confined to the
interpretation of the Amendment, expressed his profound regret that
the court should have ·be~n content to state its conclusions without
adding its reasons. He in effect construes "concurrent power" to
mean "equal and independent power", and insists that the opposite
construction contended for would result in a paramount power of
Congress or the states and not a concurrent power, and would also
in effect nullify the amendment. In elaboration he adds: ·
"Comprehensively looking at all these c<?ntentions, the confusion and contradiction to which they lead, serve in my judgment to make it certain that it cannot possibly be that Congress
and the states entered into the great ~nd important business
of amending the Constitution in a matter so vitally concerning all the people solely. in order to render governmental action
impossible, or, if possible, to so define and limit it as to cause.
it to be productive of no results and to frustr;lte the obvious
intent and general purpose contemplated. It is true indeed
that the mere words of the second section tend to these results,
·but if they be read in the light of the cardinal rule which
compels a consideration of the context in view of the situation
and the subject with which the amendment dealt and the pur-
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pose which it was intended to accomplish, the confusion will
be seen to be only apparent."
Mr. Justice McK'ienna's disagreement was 'based largely on the
normal and natural meaning of the words "concurrent power" which
the Chi~~ Justice conceded. He refused to assent to the proposition
that the interpretation· put upon concurrent power by him would
practically nullify_ the amendment, saying hopefully:
"The conviction of the evils of intemperance--the eager
and ardent sentiment that impelled the amendment, will impel
its execution through Congress and the States. It may not
be in such legislation as the Volstead Act with its ~ of 1 per
cent. of alcohol or in such legislation as some of the states
· have enacted with their 2.75 per cent. of alcohol, but it will be
a law that will be prohibitive of intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes. It may require a little time to achieve, it
may require some adjustments, but of its ultimate achi!!vement there can be no doubt."
To thi~ was ·added the comment that, if difficulties result from
· enforcing the amendment according to its terms,. they are nothing
with which the court has to do. The learned dissentient declares his
belief that the framers of the amendment "meant what they said
and that they must be taken at their word." The word "concurrent",
he insists, has the "inexorable requirement of coincident or united
action, not alternative or emergent action to safeguard against the
delinquency of Congress or the states." His analysis of the situation
resulting from the amendment is as follows:
"If it be said that the states get no power over prohibition
that they did not have before, it cannot be said that it was
not preserved to them by the amendment, notwithstanding the
policy of prohibition was made national, and besides, there
was a gift of a power to Congress that it did not have before,
a gift of a, right to be exercised within state lines, but with
the limitation or condition that the powers of the states should
remain with the states and be participated in by Congress
only in concurrence with the states, and thereby preserved
from abuse'by either, or exercise to the detriment of prohibi-

8

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

tion. There was, however, a power given to the states, a
power over importations. This power was subject to concurrence with Congress and had the same safeguards."
The remaining question in the case was whether the power to enforce the prohibition of the first section of the Amendment justified
Congress in putting the ban on liquor containing as little as one-half
of one per cent. of alcohol -by yolume. The argument against this
low limit was that, since the first section prohibited only intoxicating
liquors, the enforcing legislation must permit the sale and manufacture of non-intoxicating liquors. Otherwise the restrictive word
"intoxicating" in the first section would be nugatory. The case sustaining the one-half of one per cent. limit in the War Prohibition
Act was sought to be distinguished on the ground that the war power
is general and undefined, while the power undel." the Amendment
is confined to enforcing the prohibition against liquor in fact intoxicating. But the court, without stating or discussing these specific
contentions, adduced the JiVar Prohibition Cases9 ' for the conclusion
that, "while recognizing that ~ere are limits beyond which Congress
cannot go in treating beverages as within its power of enforcement,
we think those limits are not transcended by the provision of the
Volstead Act".10
The War Prohibition Act of 1918, passed ten days after the
armistice, came before the court in Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries
& Warehouse Co.,n and was unanimously sustained. It was interpreted to apply only to intoxicating liquo~s. Mr. Justice Brandeis
said that "prohibition of the liquor traffic is conceded to be an appropriate means of increasing our war efficiency". He recognized that
"the war power of the United States, like its other powers and like
the police powers.of the states, is subject to applicable constitutional
limitations'', but he laid down that "the Fifth Amendment imposes
• Ruppert v. Caffey, note 12, infra.
.. For an article on.the Nineteenth Amendment, see Emmet O'Neal, "The
Susan B. Anthony Amendment. Effect of Its Ratification on the Rights of
the States to Regulate and Control Suffrage and Elections", 8g CtNT. L. J.
x6g, 6 VA. L. ~. 338.
11
251 U. S. 146, 40 Sup. Ct. xo6 (1919). See 33 HAB.v. L. Rmr. 585, 6o8,
18 MICH. L. ~. 7o6, and 29 Y.AU: L. J. 437, 440. For discussions prior to the
decision, see 8 CAI.U'. L. ~. 44. 18 MICH. L. Rmr. 15g, and 29 YAI.S L J. u3.
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in this respect no greater limitation upon the national power than
does the Fourteenth Amendment upon state power". The question
wliether the immediate and absolute destruction of the value of intoxicating liquors could be caused without compensation was dismissed from consideration by pointillg out that the Act gave seven
months and nine days in which to dispose of liquors on hand. This
was held to be a reasonable period. The fact that liquor is not
readily marketable until reasonably aged was called merely an inconvenience to the owner attributable to the inherent character of
the property, which inconvenience is not a taking of property in
the constitutional sense. On the question whether the Act had become void by the passing of the war emergency, the court confined
itself to declaring that it was not convinced that the emergency had
passed when the suits in question were begun. The discussion on
this point recognizes that cliange of circumstances may operate to
render constitutionally unenforceable a statute concededly valid when
passed, and assumes for the purpose of the case that the princ;iple
is applicable to exercises of the war power. But, in view of the holding that the Act had not yet expired by its terms and of the facts
that the treaty of peace had not yet peen concluded, that the railroads were still under national control by virtue of the war powers,
and other facts of public knowledge, the court found itself unable to
conclude that the Act had ceased to be valid. The contention that
the Eighteenth Amendment impliedly guaranteed immunity. from
prohibition until one year after its ratification was dismissed by ·
pointing out that it would, if sound, emasculate the war power even
if hostilities were at their height and would also release the grasp of
state prohibition.
The war power was extended still further in Ruppert v. Caffey,12
which by a vote of five to four sustained the Volstead Act of October
28, 1919, with its suppression of the manufacture and sale of liquor
conceded ·by motion to dismiss to be non-intoxicating. Mr. Justice
McReynolds, for the minority, declared that it was notorious that the
war emergency had passed when the statute was enacted, af least so
"251 U.S. 264 40 Sup. Ct.'141 (1920). See 33 HARv. L. Riw. 585, 6o8, 24
LAW Non:s 25, and 5 VA. L. R.!tG. n. s. 874 Justices Day, Van Devanter, Mc-

Reynolds and Clark dissented.

IO
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far as any justification for the suppression of non-intoxicating liquor
concerned. H.e implied that the statute thus enforced violated
both the Fifth and Tenth Amendments. Calling the suppression of
non-intoxicants the exercise of a power implied from an .implied
power, he queried: "If all this be true, why may not the second
implied power engender a third under which Congress may forbid
the planting of barley or hops, the manufacture of bottles or kegs,
etc. ?" He insisted that there is a distinction between the control
which the states may exercise over non-intoxicants by. virtue of their
inherent power and that which may, be wielded by Congress under
authority inferred from the war power. For the majority, Mr. Justice Brandeis answered that the argument that one implied power
may not be grafted on another implied power is a mere matter of
words. The "war power over intoxicati_ng liquors extends to the enactment of laws which will not merely prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors but will effectually prev~t their sal~" All the powers
of Congress are express powers. The proper distinction is between
"specific" and "general" powers. Thus the war power over intoxicatfug liquors is as full and complete as the police powers of the
states, and the principle that the state may prohibit near beer as a
means of suppressing the gentiine article applies also to the war
power of Congress. On the question of the absence of compensation for the loss occasioned by the fact that the Volstead Act was in
effect from the moment of its enactment, Mr. Justice Brandeis said
only that "here as in Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse
Co., there was no appropriation of private property, but merely a
lessening of value due to a permissible restriction ~posed upon
its use."
The constitutionality of the Selective Sernce Law and the Espionage Act was reaffirmed in O'Connell v. United States18 on the
authority of cases decided after the writ of error in the O'Connell
case was sued out. The opinion was confined to questions of inter-·
pretation and of federal practice. A conspiracy to obstruct recruiting and enlistment by persuasion was held to be a crime within the
latter Act, and the former was found to cover false statements as to
fitness or liability for service as well when ~de by private persons
~s

"*253 U. S. - , 40 Sup. Co. 444 (1920).
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as by officers charged with the enforcement of the law. In three important casesu sustaining convictions under the Espionage Act or its
amendment of May 16, 1918, there was a difference of opinion as to
the scope and application of the First Amendment guaranteeing freedom of $peech and of the press.. It was not denied that the statute
was constitutioJ:?.2.l if properly restricted.. These cases will be considered in a later section dealing with immunities of persons charged
with crime.15
The treaty-making power and the power of Congress to enforce
treaties by legislation· was questioned in Missouri v. Holland.1 e
Great Britain and the United States had made a· treaty providing for
dosed seasons and other protection for migratory birds and engaging to enact legislation to carry the treaty into effect. Congress
thereafter passed the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. Missouri brought
a bill to enjoin the federal game warden from enforcing the act and
the authorized regulatio~ of the Secretary of Agriculture, claiming
that such enforcement encroached on -the powers reserved to it by
the Tenth Amendment. Mr:· Justice Holmes, for an unanimous
-court, laid. down that the only question was the validity of the treaty.
"'If the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of
the statute under Article l, Section 8, as a necessary and proper
means to execute the powers of the Government." The discussion
cl the specific issue before the court is prefaced by the statement:

'-----------------------------------------------------~•Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 40 Sup. Ct. 17 (1919), 'Pierce
v. United States, 253 U. S. 239, 40 Sup. Ct. 205 (1920), Schaefer v. United
:States, 251 U.S. 466, 40 Sup. Ct. 259 (1920).
"For notes on Northern Pacific Ry Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U. S. 135,
39 Sup. Ct. 502 (1919), and Dakota Central Telephone Co v. South Dakota,
250 U. S. 163, 39 Sup. Ct. 507 (1919), holding that federal control of railroads
under the war power precludes the operation of state rate regulations, see 19
CoL. L. Rsv. 489, 33 HARv. L. Rsv. 94. II5, and 68 U. PA. L. REV'. 68. See
also Henry Upson Sims, "The Power of the Federal Government to Extend
the Recent War Acts of Congress Into Times of Peace", 5 VA. L. Rsv. 87.
For incidents of federal control of the railroads, see 20 CoLUM. L. Rsv. 352,
501. For injunctions under Lever Act against the coal strike, see 5 CoRID:I.L

L.Q.14·
"'252 U. S. 416, 4CI Sup. Ct. 382 (1920). See 20 CoLUM. L. ~- 6g2 and
6 VA. L. RsG. n. s. 214 For discussions prior to the decision see 8 CALIF.
L. Rsv. 177, 33 HARv. L. Rsv. 281, 312, 23 LA.w N~s 148, 68 U. PA. L. REV'.
16o, and 29 YAU: L. J. 445.
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"Acts of Congress are made the supreme law of the land
only when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while
treaties are declared to be so when made under the authority
of the United States. It is open to question whether the authority of the United States means more than the formal acts
prescribed to make the convention. We do not mean to imply
that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making power;
but th,!!y must be ascertained in a different way."
What this different way is is not definitely set forth, but the treaty
in question was found to involve "a national interest of very nearly
the first magnitude." The inference is that the test of the validity
of a treaty is an adequate national interest in the subject matter
with which it deals. The fact that the states are individuaUy incompetent to deal with the subject matter seems to be regarded as
important. "It is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring
national action, 'a power which must -belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government' is not to be found." Then follows a plea for a progressive recognition of new nation~l needs:
"When we are dealing with words that are also a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we
must realize that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by
the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to
realize or to hope that they had created an organi,sm; it has
taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and
bl_ood to prove that they created a nation. The case before
us must be considered in the light of our whole experience
and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.
The treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitory
words to be found in· the Constitution. The only question
is whether it is forbidden by some invisible radiation from
the general tenns of the Tenth Amendment. We must consider what this country has become in deciding what that
. amendment has reserved."
The opinion makes clear that a treaty on any subject of national
interest has nothing to fear from any reserved powers of the states.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN
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Its hint that there may be .no other test to be applied than whether
the treaty has been duly concluded indicates that the court might
hold that specific constitutional limitations in favor of individual
liberty and property are not applicable to deprivations wrought by
treaties.. It would be going a step further to exten~ the same immunity to legislation enforcing treaties. _It is of course not safe to
take expressions in a juqicial opinion as the considered judgment of
all the members of the court. Missouri's contention in the principal
case received the approval of Justices Pitney and Van Devanter
who dissented, but without giving their reasons.11
In the endeavor to allow state workmeJ?.'S compensation laws to
apply to injuries within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
vested in the federal courts, Congress in 1917 added to the admiralty
provision of the Judicial Code a clause saving "to claimants their
rights and remedies ~nder the worknien's compensation laws of any
state." This provision a majority of the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart.18 The b.asis
of the decision seems to be a belief that the Constitution somehow
adopted and es~blished the approved rules of general maritime law
and that such power as Congress has under the necessary and proper
1

' See a note in 29 Y.ALS L. J. II4 on the effect of a treaty on a state tax
law. Articles on the League of Nations and the Constitution will be found
in 8g CsN'l'. L. J. 2I, 70, 79, 93, II3, 226, 244, and 370. See also Edward S.
Corwin, "The Power of Congress to Declare Peace'', 18 MICH. L. Rltv. 66!),
John M. Matthews, "The League of Nations and the Constitution", 18 MICH.
L. Rsv. 378, Albert H. Washburn, "Treaty Amend~ents and Reservations",
5 CoIUttLL L. Q. 247, and Quincy Wright; ''Treaties and the Constitutional
Separation of Powers in the United States'', 12 AM. J. IN'l'. LAW 64 "The
Legal Nature of Treaties", 13 AY. J. INT. LAW 7o6, "The Constitutionality of
T.reaties", 13 AM. J. IN'l'. LAW 242, "Conflicts of International Law with National Laws and Ordinances", I I AM. J. IN'l'. LAW l, "Amendments and Reservations to the Treaty'', 4 MINN. L. Rsv. 14, and ''Validity of the Proposed
Reservations to the Treaty'', 20 CoLUY.. L. Rltv. I2I.
11
253 U.S.--, 40 Sup. Ct. 438 (I920). The majority opinion is by Mr.
Justice McReynolds. The dissenting Justices are Holmes, Pitney, Brandeis
and Clarke. See 8 CALIF. L. Rsv. 339, 20 CoLUY.. L. Rsv. 685, I8 MICH. L.
Ritv. 793, and 29 Y.Aa L. J. 925. For discussions prior to the decision see 8
CALIF. L. Ritv. I6g, 5 CoRNl':LL L. Q. 275, and 4 MINN. L. Rltv. 444. A few
months before the Knickerbocker case, the Supreme Court had held that the
amendment in question is not retroactive. Peters v. Vesey, 25I U. S. l2I,
40 Sup. Ct. 65 (I9I9). See 29 YALE L. J. 363.
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clause to add to or change the maritime law is limited to the attainment of the object of relieving "maritime commerce from unnecessary burdens and disadvantages incident to discordant legislation"
and the establishment "so far as practicable" of "harmonious and ·
uniform rules applicable throughout every part of the United States."
Instead of doing this Congress was thought to have attemp~ed to
delegate its powers to the states, which under recognized principles'
it cannot do. For the minority Mr. Justice Holmes insisted that,
since the state compensation law in question was in force when Congress passed the act of 1917, it should be regarded as having been
.adopted by Congress as part of the federal maritime law. He was
further of opinion that it would not be a delegation of power to the
states if Congress adopted in advance their future compensation
laws, just as Congress has provided that the practice in the federal
-courts shall conform as near ~s may be to the practice in the state
courts; -but he thought it not necessary to go so far in order to allow
the application of ~e law before the court. He denied that the Constitution itself adopted any maritime law by extending the federal
judicial power to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and
he found no ·implication in-the Constitution that such maritime law as
Congress may establish must be uniform throughout the United
States. It would be extravagant, he declared, to read into the silence
<>f the Constitution "a requirement of uniformity more mechanical
than "is educed from the express requirement of equality in the Fourteenth Amendment."111
The power of Congress to attach conditions to the appropriation
·Of money to pay private claims raised a sharp difference of opinion
in Calhoun v. Massie. 20 The court had previously sustained a clause
1n the statute providing that not more then twenty per cent. of the

s:

,.For a note on Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.
Co., 247 U. S. 372, 38
Sup. Ct. SOI (1918), holding the common-law rules of liability inapplicable to
an injury within the admiralty jurisdiction, see 33 HARv. L. :Rl,!v. 300, 309.
For a note on Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U. S. 3o8, 39 Sup. Ct. II2
(1919), holding a state statute of frauds inapplicable to a maritime contract,
see 8 CAI.nt. L. :Rl,!v. u4
'"253 U. S. - - , 40 Sup. Ct. 474 (1920). Justices McKenna, Van Devanter, Pitney; and McReynolds dissent. The same statute was declared to .
be valid in Newman v. Moyers, 252 U.S.--, 40 Sup. Ct. 478 (1920).
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money paid by the government should be paid to or received by any
attorney on account' of services rendered in connection with the
claim.· In that case21 Mr. Justice McKenna had said that if the judgment of the attorney against his client sought to reach only assets
other tha~ those received from the Government, "the limitation in
the act appropriating the money to 20 ·per cent. as the amount to be
•paid fo an agent or attorney would have no a.pplication or be involved." In the principal case, Calhoun who had received from the
Government twenty per cent. of the amount awarded to his client
Massie, stied· in a state court to get an additional thirty per cent.
under a contract made before the passage of the appropriation bill
containing the limitation previously referred to and also. this additional one:
"It shall be unlawful for any agent or agents, attorney or
attorneys to exact, collect, withhold or receive any sum which
in the aggregate exceeds twenty percentum of the amount of
any item appropriated "in this -bill on account of services rendered or advances made in connection with said claim, any
contract to the contrary notwithstanding."
Massie insisted that this ·clause protected him from paying from
any source more than twenty per cent. of what he received from the
government, and a majority of the Supreme Court agreed with him~
Mr. Justice Brandeis found the clause in question so clear as tQ leave
"no room for construction." Mr. Justice McReynolds, for the
minority, without quoting or discussing the paragraph in question,
rebuked his colleague for not quoting or dic;cussing the previous
dictum of Mr. Justice McKenna by saying that "the result is necessarily injurious both' to the court and to the public." It is doubtful
whether this dictum was intended, as Mr. Justice McReynolds assumes, to apply to the paragraph .of the statute adduced by Mr.
~assie. If it did, it is pretty obviously erroneous. The dissent is
not confined to the question of construction, though Mr. Justice McReynolds says nothing more specific on the constitutional issue than
to remind us that "the Fifth Amendment was intended to protect the
individual against arbitrary exercise of federal power'' and that its
21

Capit~l

Trust Co. v. Calhoun, 250 U.S. 208, 39 Sup. Ct. 486 (1919).
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"inhibition protects every man ·in 1iis right to engage in honest and
useful work for compensation." His earlier mention of the fact that
the contract in question was made prior to the statute regulating the
fee to be charged leaves it doubtful whether his dissent would
apply to such a regulation that is wholly prospective. He rests his
objections wholly on grounds of due process, without touching on
the possible point that the regulation of private contracts goes beyond the field of federal power and poaches on the reser\red preserves
of the states. For the majority, Mr. Justice Brandeis posits the constitutionality of the statute on the fact that the appropriation to pay
. the claim is a condition precedent to liability on the part of the client
to the attorney. Calhoun's chance to get anything is dependent on
congressional grace or favor. Therefore the favor may be extended
on terms. He has no constitutional right to bite the hand which
feeds him. Since he undertook to get his client's claim approved
by tlie government, his assent to the terms under which the approval
was given may be implied. He is also estopped from repudiating
the statute after he has received his authorized twenty per cent. .under
it.· Of these "special reasons", Mr. Justice McReynolds says that
one_"can only serve to mislead" an.d the other "lacks substance and
can serve no good purpose". Both, he insists, assume the construction and the constitutionality of the statute. Cases cited in the majority opinion "as authority for such oppressive legislation" are said
to "give it no support," and it is pointed out wherein the statutes
therein sustained stop short of the one before the court. Mr. Justice
McReynolds takes much more pains to prove Mr. Justice Brandeis
wrong than to prove himself right. His peppery opinion gives interesting evidence of the human factors that enter into the solution
of constitutional issues. .
In Ervien v. United States2 2 the answer to an interesting constitutional question is assumed without discussion or citation of authority. The Enabling Act-under which New Mexico was admitted
to the Union granted the new state certain public lands on specified
trusts. The state later proposed to spend three per cent. of the proceeds from the sale of the lands in advertising the advantages of the
state as a place to live in. The District Court thought this a wise
22

251 U.S. 41, 40 Sup. Ct. 75 (1919).
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administration of the trust as it tended to enhance the price of the
lands. This, the Supreme Court did not deny, but it held nevertheless that the United State~ as grantor might, as it did, reserve control over the matter and exact the performance of the conditions on
which the lands were given and held. This case, like the preceding
one, illustrates the power of the United States to keep a string
attached to its grants and to continue to pull the string even though
all bu~ the string has passed f_rom its control. In this respect the case
differs from stipulations in enabling acts which seek to continue
control over the public, governmental powers of states admitted
thereunder.23
The other cases on national pow'er are of minor importance, with
the exception of those involving questions of taxation and of commerce which will be treated in succeeding sections. National control over the Indians, was sustained in two decisions. United States
v. Board of Commissioners24. sanctioned the authority of the United
States, as guardian of the Indians to bring a suit in the federal courts
to protect lands owned by non:competent Indians from illegal state
taxes. The fact that th.e lands were taxable by the state after proper
assessment was held insufficient to deprive the United States of its
duty and right to ensure that its wards are not illegally deprived of
the pr()perty rights previously conferred upon them. This same
benevolent guardianship of the Indians arose also in Nadeau v. Union
Pacific R. Co.,25 which affirmed a grant to a railroad in 1862 of a
four hundred foot strip of land through an Indian reservation. The
tract was said to be "part of the domain held by the tribe under the
ordinary Indian claim-the right of possession and occupancy-with
fee fo the United States." On the authority of earlier decisions it
was declared that "the power of the United States, as guardian for
the Indians, to legislate in respect to such lands is settled." Patents
issued subsequent to the grant to the railroad, without expressly reserving a right of way to the road, were held to give no rights to the
strip in question. Any claim based on occupancy or possession was
~See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559. 31 Sup. Ct. 688 (19n). For an article
bearing on the general question involved in the Ervien case, see Andrew A.
Bruce, "State Socialism and the School Land Grants", 33 HARv. L. Rtv. 401.
»251 U.S. 128, 40 Sup. Ct. 100 (1919).
"'253 U. S. - , 40 Sup. Ct. 570 (1920).
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said to be precluded by earlier decisions. Mr. Justice Clarke dissented, and Justices Holmes, Pitney and Brandeis did not sit.
While it is not clear that any constitutional issue was directly involved in Burnap v. United Stcttes,26 Mr. Justice Brandeis in the
course of the opinion pointed out that Congress might invest the
appointment of inferior officers either in the President alone, in the
courts of law, or in the heads of departments. The power to remove
was declared to be, "in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, an incident of the power to appoint." The term "head of a
department'', as used in the statute, was said to mean "the Secretary
in charge of a great division of t~e executive branch of the government, like the State, Treasury, and War, who is a member of the
Cabinet", and not to "include heads of bureaus of lesser divisions:" 21
Another case involving the application of an uncontested constitutional principle is Evans v. National Bank of Savannah.28 It was
agreed that the powers of a national bank in respect to discounts and
the rate to be charged is subject to the control ?f Congress and not
of the sbrtes. But Congress had prescribed that the rate to be
charged should be that "allowed by the laws of the state or territory
where the bank is located, and no more:" The application of this
provision to the case at bar depended upon a combination of elementary mathematics and advanced jurisprudence. The Georgia
statute forbade a rate of interest in excess of eight ·per cent. "either
directly or i~directly by way of commission for advances." The
Georgia supreme court held that eight per cent. discount charged in
advance was more than eight per cent. interest. Mr. Justice Pitney
for himself and Justices Brandeis and Clarke agreed. He insisted
that "the laws of the state" as used by Congress meant rtot merely
the words of particular sections of state statutes, but "aj.l applicable
provisions of the statutes as interpreted and construed by the decisions of the court of last resort" of the state. Mr. Justice McReynolds, for the majoriti, did not specifically controvert these positions,
but he relied on the rule of the federal courts that it is not usurious
•252 U. S. 512, 40 Sttp. Ct. 374 (1920).
"For a discussion of the President's power of removal, see Thomas Reed
Powell, ''The President's Veto of the Budget Bill", 9 NA'l'. MuN. R:Ev. 538.
•251 U. S. 1o8, 40 Sup. Ct. 58 (1919). See 33 HARv. L. R:Ev. 725, 18
MicH. L. Rsv. 345, and 29 YAL"£ L. J. 457.
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to collect the highest rate of legal interest at the time the loan is
made, and insisted that the power given to national banks to discount
notes includes "the power, which banks generally exercise, of discounting notes reserving charges at the highest rate permitted for
interest." He looked to the state law only for the rate, and to the
national
law for the definition
of usury.29•
.
.

II.

Rl<:GUI,A'l'ION OP COMMI":RC:E

Power of Congress
The extensive power of Congress over foreign commerce finds
illustration in Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon.'8° This sustained a provision in the Seamen's Act which, as interpreted, entitles any seaman
shipping in foreign ports on foreign ships to disregard contracts
postponing payment of wages until the end of the voyage and to
demand at any American port one-half the wages earned to date.
If ·the demand is not complied. with, the seaman may sue in a federal
district court for the entire wages then earned. Most of the opmion
of Mr. Justice Day deals with the question of interpretation. The
shipping company, backed by the British Embassy, urged that the
Act should be limited to American seamen; but the court adduced
agai~st them the plain language of the statute and the further consideration that such "construction would have a tendency to prevent
the employment of American seamen, and to promote the ~gageI.

•For a note on the power of a national bank to manage a railroad, see
J. LeBoeuf, "National Banks as
Fiduciaries in New York", 5 CoRNEI.I. L. Q. 128, and Walter Wyatt, "Fiduciary
Powers of National Banks", 6 VA. L. IU:v. 301.
For a discussion of the national postal power, see Robert E. Cushman,
"National Police Power Under the Postal Clause of the Constitution", 4
33 HARv. L. IU:v. 718, 72£,. .See also Randall

MINN

L. Rtv.

402.

Consideration of the power of the national government over aliens will
be found in Howard L. Bevis, "The Deportation of Aliens", 68 U. PA. L. RJ;:v.
97, and notes in 20 Cor.U'M. L. Rt\'. 68o, 18 MICH. L. Rtv. 422, 6 VA. L. IU:v.
201, and 29 YAI.~ L. J. 561. The right of aliens to take real property is discussed in 5 CoRm:t.r. L. Q. 209• 253 U.S. 348, 40 Sup. Ct. 350 (1920). The case is followed in Thompson v. Lucas (The Westmeath), 253 U. S. 358, 40 Sup. Ct. 353 (1920). See
20 Cor.tra. L. Rtv. 479, and for comment prior to the decision, 20 Cor.tra.

L. Rtv. 207.

20

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

ment of those who were not _entitled to sue for one-half wages under
the provisions of the law" and thus defeat the purpose of Congress
in passing it. The constitutional issue involved was declared to .have
been settled by an earlier case111 in which the conclusion was "reached
that the jurisdiction of this government over foreign merchant vessels in our ports was such as to give authority to Congress to make
provisions of the character now under consideration; that it was for
thi~ government to determine upon what terms and conditions vessels of other countries might be permitted to enter our harbors, and
to impose conditions upon the shipment of sailors in our own ports
and make them applicable to foreign as well as domestic vessels."
.From this it seems that ships which wish to enter our ports must behave according to our taste on the high seas and in their home ports.
Board of Public Utility Commissioners v. Ynchausti & Co.32 found
no denial of due process of law in an order of the Philippine Board
of Public Utility Commissioners requiring the free carriage of mails
as a condition of granting to vessels a permit to engage in the coastwise trade. The case was said to depend entirely upon the power to
limit the coastwise trade•. This was found to be plenary. Hence it
was assumed to follow inevitably that no condition attached to. a
grant could deny due process of law. There is a hint in the opinion
of the Chief Justice that the doctrine of the case is limited to legislation for "territory not forming part of the United States because not
incorporated therein" under the principles of the Insular Cases; but
the hint is back-handed and, in view of the frequent declarations of
the complete power of Congress over foreign commerce, it must be
doubted whether any distinction would be made in favor· of ships
engaged in that commerce. yet plainly the opinion leaves room for
a different attitude towards a congressional regulation of the interstate coasting trade. The order was questioned under the due-process clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights, which, it was recognized,
was intended by Congress to have in the Philippines the settled con~
struction that similar clauses receive in the United States. Yet it
was added that the "result of their application must depend upon the
u Patterson v. Ba~k Eudora, 190 U. S.' 169, 23 Sup. Ct. 821 (1903) •
.. 251 U.S. 401, 40 Sup. Ct. 27'1 (1920).
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nature and character of the powers conferred by Congress upon the
government of the Islands."
The so-called Reed Amendment which had been sustained in an
earlier case,83 came before the court again in United State~ v.
Si-mpson,84 in which a person who transported five gallons of whiskey
in his own automobile sought to escape from the toils of the statute.
Mr. J ust~e Clarke in dissenting insisted that "interstate commerce,
in the constitutional sense, is defined to mean commercial, business,
intercourse" and especially "the exchange, buying or selling of commodities, of merchandise, on a large scale between the inhabitants
of different states." He thought that liquor purchased by a man
for his personal use and transported by him in a private vehicle was
"withdrawn from trade or commerce as thus defined", and that at
the time when the Reed AmenCiment was enacted Congress had no
power to deal with Mr. Simpson on such a frolic of his own. "The
~t of power to Congress is over Commerce,-not over isolated
movements of small amounts of private property, by private persons
for their personal use." The rest of the court contented themselves
with asserting, through Mr. Justice Van Devanter, that the introduction of intoxicating liquor across state lines into forbidden territory
"could be effected only through transportation, and whether this took
-0ne. form' or another it was transportation in interstate commerce."
In refusing to restrict the nat.ural meaning of the words of the
statute, Mr. Justice Van Devanter"pointed out that the law would
not be of much practical benefit if its purpose could be frustrated by
transportation in automobiles. Mr. Justice Clarke in his dissent said
he thought that the Hill case was wrongly decided. Mr. Justice McReynolds who had dissented with him in the Hill case concurred
1n this.
Three prosecutions under the Sherman Anti-trust Law turned
wholly on the q~estion whether there had been restraint of trade, it
being assumed that the trade involved was interstate commerce. sG
.. United States v. Hill, 248 U. S. 420, 39 Sup. Ct. 143 (1919).
"252 U.S. 465, 40 Sup. Ct. 364 (1920). See 26 W. VA. L. Q. 73, and 29
YAL"€ L. J. 922. For a general article see Lindsay Rogers, "'Life, Liberty,
and Liquor': A Note on the Police Power", 6 VA. L. R.Ev. 156.
15
In United States v. United States Steel Corporation, 251 U. S. 417, 40
Sup. Ct 293 (1920), the acts charged were regarded by four judges as not
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Blumenstock Brothers' Advertising Agency v. Curtis Publishing
Co.,88 however, turned on a construction of the commerce clause.
This was a suit for triple damages under the Sherman Act, based
on the refusal of the defendant to accept advertising from the plaintiff unless the plaintiff would accede to the defendant's conditions as
to advertising in·rival publications. The court held that the complaint
did not state a cause of action, since the contracts for advertising
were not interstate commerce. Mr. Justice Day's reference to cases
on insurance carries the implication that advertising is not commerce,
but this is not explicitly stated, and the case is direct authority only
on the question whether the contracts or commerce in question were
interstate. In answering this in the negative, 'Mr. Justice Day said
that "the advertising contracts did not involve any movement of
goods or merchandise in interstate commerce or any transmission of
intelligence in such commerce." The circulation of the journals in
interstate commerce was thought not to "depend upon or have any
direct relation to the advertising contract." The case was said to
within the statute. Justices Day, Pitney, and Clarke dissented, and Justices
McReynolds and Brandeis did not sit, so that a minority of the full bench
was sufficient to give the defendant a clean bill of health. See 20 Cor,UM.
L. Rtv. 462, and 33 HARv. L. R!v. 964. 986. In United States v. Reading Co.,
253 U.S.--, 40 Sup. Ct. 425 (1920), the three judges who dissente!f in the
Steel case joined with Justices McKenna, McReynolds and Brandeis in finding
the defendant guilty of an illegal monopoly under the Act. The Chief Justice
and Justices Holmes and Van Devanter dissented. In United States v. A.
Schrader's Son, 252 U. S. 85, 40 Sup. Ct. 251 (1920), the making of agreements by manufacturers with retailers for the purpose of maintaining resale
prices were held to be an unlawful restraint of trade. Mr. Justice Clarke
confined his concurrence to the result, and Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented. See 33 HARv. L. R!v. ¢6, 986, 18 MICH. L. Rtv. 556, and 29 YAL't
L. J. 6g6. The Schrader case was distinguished from United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 39 Sup. Ct. 465 (1919), decided the preceding term,
on the ground that in the Colgate case there were no definite contracts for resale price maintenance. ·For notes on the Colgate· case see 5 CoRID:LL L. Q.
100 and 29 YAI.'t L. J. 365. For other notes on cases on unfair competition
and restraint of trade see 20 CoLU"lf. L. R!v. 328, 5 CoRNJtI.I, L. Q. 323, 33
HARv. L. Rtv. 320, 617, 18 MICH. L R!v. 71, and 29 YAJ.'t L•. J. 125. See also
Charles Grove Haines, "Efforts to Define Unfair Competition", 29 YAU: L. J.
l, and William Notz, "The Webb-Pomerene Law-Extraterritorial Scope of
the Unfair Competition Clause", 29 YAL't L. J. 2g.
·
11
252 U. S. 436, 40 Sup. Ct. 385 (1920).
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be wholly unlike one involving a correspondence school37 "wherein
there was a continuous interstate traffic in text-books arid apparatus
for a course of study pursued by interstate commerce", and more like
the cases holding that insurance is not commerce and a case88 in
which the court was said to have held that "a broker engageq in
negotiating sales between residents of Tennessee and non-resident
merchants of goods situated in another state was not engaged in
interstate commerce."89
The general terms of the federal Employers' Liability Law contain no specifications as to when injured employees are engaged in
International Text-book Co. v. ~igg, 217 U.S. 91, 30 Sup. Ct. 481 (1910).
•Ficklen v. Shelby County, 145 u~ s. l, 12 Sup. Ct. 810 (1892). This
case did not, when decided, proceed on any theory that the broker was not
engaged io interstate commerce. It sustained a license on the privilege of
doing a general business.which included intra-state as well as interstate commerce. The fact that the broker asked for a license which included intrastate business was regarded as controlling. The difficulty of sustaining the
case on the theory adduced in the opinion has led the court lately to .slide it
over the ground that the nature of° the brokerage business is one degree removed •from interstate commerce.
•An interesting case under the Federal Trade Commission· Act of 1914
is Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 252 U.S.--, 40 Sup. Ct. 572 (1920).
The Commission after notice and hearing had ordered Gratz to desist from
refusing to sell ties for cotton bales unless the purchaser bought bagging
at the same time. Under the provisions 9£ the statute the defendant applied
to the Circuit Court of Appeals to set aside the order of the Commission. The
petition was granted for the reason given that the evidence failed to show
that the practice complained of was general and that the Commission had not
jurisdictio~ to determine the merits of specific individual grievances. The
opinion of the Supreme Court, by 'Mr. Justice McReynolds, 5ustains the dismissal of the order of the Commission, on the ground that the complaint
issued by the Commis.sion fails to state facts sufficient to show that the defendlint's refusal to sell ties without bagging is unfair or detrimental to the
public interest. Mr. Justice Brandeis, in dissenting, insisted that the complaint
filed by 'the Commission was sufficient though in general terms, that the Commission is vested with power to forbid "unfair methods" of competition before those methods become established as a general practice, that the Circuit
Court of Appeals had found that the specific facts charged were supported
by the evidence, and that these facts included suffi.cient evidence of a dominating position enjoyed by the defendants so that it was not unreasonable
for the Commission to find that the methods used amounted to "unfair competition." Mr. Justice Clarke joined in the dissent. Mr. Justice Pitney confined his concurrence to the result. See 20 Cor.. L. Rmr. 8o6.
11
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interstate commerce so as to come within the Act. This is fo£t to
the courts in ·each individual case. The issue is not the constitutionality of the statute but the constitutionality of its application to a
particular state of facts. In four cases during the past term the
employee was held to have been engaged in interstate commerce at
the time of his injury. The test applied is whether the work being
done is so closely related to interstate commerce as to be practically
a part of it. Erie R. Co. v. Collinsl0 involved an employee who
operated a signal tower and water tank, both accessory to the operation of interstate trains. He was hurt by an explosion of the gasoline tank for the pump for the water tank. Erie R. Co. v. Szary41
involved an employee whose job was to dry sand for use in engines
some of which were used in interstate commerce. After sanding some
engines destined for other states, he emptied the ashes from the
stuve, took them in a pail across the tracks to the ash pit, emptied
the pail, got a drink of water at the engine house, was hit by an
engine when crossing the track again to get the pail. In these two
cases suit had been brought under the federal law, so the employee
guessed right. Justices Van Devanter and Pitney dissented in both
cases. In the next two cases the employee souglit to come within
state compensation acts and got his award only to ha~e the Supreme
Court set it aside and hold he should have sued under the federal
law .. Mr. Justice Clarke dissented in both cases. In Southern Pacific
Co. ·v. Inditstrial Accident Commission42 the deceased was killed
while wiping insulators supporting a wire carrying power then used
in the propulsion of interstate trains. In Philaaelphia & Reading
R. Co. v. Hancock 43 the accident occurred to one aiding in transporting from the coal mines a train of cars some of which were destined
for other states. The court held that the interstate transportation
had already begun, though the crew to which plaintiff belonged took
them only to the yard. from which they were taken by another crew
to scales ten miles away, after· which they were first billed to extrastate consignees. But the shipping clerk at the mine designated the
0

253
ci253
.. 251
43
253
'

U. S. --, 40 Sup. Ct. 450 (1920).
U. S. --, 40 Sup. Ct. 454 (1920) •
U.S. 259, 40 Sup. Ct. 130 (1920).
U. S. --, 40 Sup. Ct. 512 (1920).
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particular cars that were to go outside the state, and the freight
charges were through rates from the mine to the ultimate destina- ·
tion.4 ~

In New York Central R. Co. v. Mohney4 5 the question was
whether.a release of liability contained in a pass should be governed
by the state or federal law. This was thought to depend on the question whether the passenger was on a local or interstate jaurney when
the injury occurred, but the character of the journey was determined
by the charactei: of the pass on which the plaintiff was travelling.
The pass was good only between two points within Ohio. Plaintiff
intended to pay his fare from the second Ohio city to a third, where
he was to get a promised pass good from there to his ultimate destination in Pennsylvania. Justices Day and Van Devanter thought
that under the facts he was on an interstate journey when injured on
the first stretch. But Mr. Justice Clarke, for the majority, held that
the contract must govern and not the int~ntion of the traveller. As
the only contract he had was a pass between two local points, he was
on a local journey. "The mental purpose of one of the parties to a
written contract cannot change its terms." The application of the
decision is doubtless limited to the particular issue before the court,
since it was declared that the written contract of release qn the pass
was the only reliance of the defendant.46
"In Hull v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co., 252 U. S. 475, 40 Sup. Ct.
358 (I920), an agreement between two connecting railroads that each· might
run trains manned by its crews over the line of the other and that each would
be responsible for all accidents on its own line was held not to make a perso11
hired by one road an employee of the other when on its line so as to be able
to sue the latter under the Employers' Liability Law. Mr. Justice Clarke dissented. See 20 CoLuM. L. Rtv. 709.
In I9 CoLUM. L. Rtv. 395 is a note to Kinzell v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry.
Co., 250 U. S. I30, 39 Sup. Ct. 4I2 (I9I9), and Philadelphia, B. & W. R Co.
v. Smith, 250 U.S. ·IOI, 39 Sup. Ct. 396 (I9I9), two cases decided during the
October, I9I8, term, and holding employees within the federal Employers'
Liability Law. The latter case is also commented on in 6 VA. L. Riw. 66.
See 68 U. PA. L. Rsv. 372 for a note on the "Nature of the Services of a Flagman at a Crossing Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act."
"252 U.S. I52, 40 Sup. Ct. 287 (I920). See 29 YALE L. J. 8o3 .
.. In Fort Smith & W. R. Co. v. Mills, 253 U. S. - - , 40 Sup. Ct. 526
(I920), the Adamson Law was held not to apply to an insolvent railroad in
the hands of a receiver which had a wage agreement with its employees who
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2.

State Police Power and Interstate Commerce

The last three cases. which for convenience were included under
the head of the power of Congress, belong technically in the group
now being considered. The questio~ in each case was whether the
subject matter was interstate or local in character. The intra-state
pass was held to make the journey oti. wlllch it was used an intrastate journey at least for the purpose of allowing state law to control
the effect of a stipulation in the pass against liability for injury to
the holder. In the other two cases state compensation laws were
held inapplicable because the injuries were found to be within the
scope of the federal Employers' Liability Law. State action on a
matter normally within reserved state power was precluded because
Congress under its commerce power had taken control of the same
matter. The only question was whether the injuries occurred in
local or in interstate commerce, since it had previously been settled
that Congress had taken within its control the regulation of liability
for all injuries to employees engaged in interstate commerce and
that the state law could not apply to such injuries even though the
federal law provided no remedy. It is not, however, a universal
rule that all state action is necessarily precluded by congressional
regulation of matters within the general field in question. If the
state law is in conflict with the congressional prescription, it is of
not only refrained from making any demands under the Adamson Law but
appreciated the situation and desired to continue under the existing agreement.
· Kansas City So. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 252 U. S. 178, 40
Sup. Ct. 187 (1920), ordered the defendant to obey the Act of Congress in
regpe.."f: to making a physical valuation of the railroads and to ascertain the
present cost of condemnation and damages, or of purchase in excess of the
original cost or present value, notwithstanding the declarations of the Supreme
Court in the Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729 (1913) that
the estimation of such hypothetical cost was "wholly beyond reach of any
process of rational determination", was based on an "impossible hypothesis",
and would be an indulgence in "mere speculation" and "mere conjecture."
The court evidently assumes that the members of the commission are endowed
with some supernatural powers which mere judges lack.
For articles on federal control of the railroads, see J. A. Fowler, "Federal
Power to Own and Operate Railroads in Peace Time", 33 HARV. L. Riw. 775,
Gerard C. Henderson, "Railway Valuation and the Courts", 33 HARv. L. Riw.
902, 1031, and Fordney Johnston, "The Transportation Act, 1920", 6 VA.
L. Riw.482.
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course inapplicable. Where the two are not in conflict, the question
is whether Congress has meant to cover the whole field or only that
part it has specifically dealt with. This was the issue in three cases
decided during the last term.
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Public Service Commissionu had before it
the question whether a state statute requiring a platform and guard
rails on the rear end of the last car of trains was precluded by any
federal regulation. The car which violated the state statute was a
mail car. Mr. Justice Holmes said that the federal rules for the
construction of mail cars not only exclude the platform required by
the state but provide an equipment for. them when used as end cars.
They also provide for caboose cars without such platforms as the
state requires. Since caboose cars are constantly used as end cars,
the federal law makes lawful such an end car as the state law forbids. Mr. Justice Clarke, who alone dissented, looked at the state
order as directed at trains rather than at individual cars. He found
no evidence that the Interstate Commerce Commission had prescribed how trains should be made up or what sort of cars should
be put at the end. Caboose cars are commonly attached to slowmoving freight trains, not to fast-moving express and mail trains.
No federal requirement would be inter£ered with if the railroad
carried at the end of its trains the kind of car demanded by the state.
The federal. rules have a different purpose and therefore have not
occupied the whole field of the regulation of trains. But eight members of the court thought otherwise.
· .
In two unanimous decisions it was laid down that Congress had
so far taken over the regulation of interstate telegraphic communication as to preclude the application of state laws on matters allowed
to be within state control until Congress acts. Postal TelegraphCable Co. v. Warren-Godwin Lumber Co.48 negatived the application of the Mississippi doctrine that a stipulation limiting liability for
"250 U.S. 566, 40 Sup. Ct. 36 (I919). See 5 VA. L. R!G. n. s. 7I9, and
29 YALE L. J. 456•
. '"25I U. S. ZJ, 40 Sup. Ct. 6g (I919). See 33 HARv. L. Rm. g88, 14 Iu,.
L. Rm. 525, 5 IowA I;. B. 28o, 18 MICH. L. Rsv. 418, 4 MINN. L. R!v. 293,
U. PA. L. Rm. 259, and 29 YALE L. J. 566. For discussions prior to the de-

cision see W. M. Williams, "Applicability of the Interstate Commerce Act to
Telegraph Companies", go CEN't. L. J. 370, and notes in 18 Cor.u:r.i:. L. Ra.
612, and 18 MICH. L. R!v. 248.
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·error in transmitting an unrepeated message is void as one limiting
liability for negligence, and held the contract governed by the contrary rule obtaining in the federal courts. Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Boegli49 saved the company from a penalty fixed by the law
of Indiana for failure to deliver a message promptly. The Act of
Congress looked to in both cases for the banishment of state authority was the 1910 Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act. This
allows telegraph companies to establish reasonable rates subject to
the control of the Interstate Commerce Commission, requires their
rates to be equal and uniform, and permits the classification of messages into day, night, repeated, unrepeated, etc., with different rates
for each class. This specific authorization to vary the rates as a
message is repeated or unrepeated was thought "unmistakably to
draw under the federal control the very power which the construction given below to the act necessarily denied." The purpose of Congress in its provisions was said to be to subject interstate telegraph
companies to a uniform national rule, and to exclude the possibility
of applying varying state laws. The state penalty failed because the
sb.te law did not apply. The state rule as to the legality of the limitation of liability failed b.ecause, since the subject is under federal
law, it is governed by the non-existent federal common law consisting of those principles of general jurisprudence which the federal
courts modestly profess to be better able to discover than are their
colleagues who sit in state tribunals. e>0
In the absence of congressional regulation, the states are allowed
to regulate such interstate commerce as is not "national in character."
Only over such commerce as is thought to require uniformity of
regulation throughout the country is the mere grant to Congress regarded as a grant of the whole power and therefore a prohibition on
the states. And interstate commerce, even though "national in
character" and hence such a~ to req~re uniformity of re~lation,
may still be subjected to state requirements in minor matters, provided Congress has not passed inconsistent regulations or taken the
whole field within its control. Reiterated formulae as to the ex"251 U.S. 315, 40 Sup. Ct. 167 (1920).

"For notes on the law governing telegraph messages between two points
within the same state but routed partly through another state, see 18 MICH.
L. Rmr. 559 and 4 MINN. L. Rr:v. 295.
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elusiveness of congressional power over such commerce are saved
from formal impairment by saying that the state requirements which
are sanctioned do not "regulate" interstate commerce, but merely "incidentally affect" it. Thus "regulate" becomes a word of art which
applies, not to all that regulates in fact, but only to that which regulates too much or in some disapproved way. The cases decided during the past term afford two rather striking instances of this tolerant
attitude towards state laws thought merely to affect interstate commerce incidentally without regulating it.
Pennsylvania. Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission,51 allowed the
New York Public Service Commission to prescribe the rates. for
natural gas piped from Pennsylvania and furnished to consumers of
a New York municipality. There was no break in the continuity of
the transmission, as there had been in· some previous cases, and the
court was clear that such commerce is interstate and that the local
rates may affect the interstate business of the company. But the
service which was rendered was said to be essentially local, and not
one that requires general and uniform regulation of rates by congressional action. Obviously the deciding factor in the case is a
judgment that. it is better for the rates to be regulated than for the
monopoly to demand what it pleases, and that any interference with
the freedom of interstate commerce is the lesser of two evils and one
readily obviated by national action whenever Congress sees fit. 52
South Covington & Cincinnati St. Ry. Co. v. Kentucky5 8 alJowed
a state Jim Crow car law to apply to an interurban street railway
•
company though eighty
per cent. of ·its traffic was interstate. Mr.
Justice Day wrote a dissenting opinion which was concurred in by
Justices Van Devanter and Pitney. This pointed out that Ohio,
across the river, forbade the separation of passengers according to
11

252 U.S. 23, 40 Sup; Ct. 279 (1920). See 68 U. PA. L. Rr:v. 393 and 29
YAJ.E L. J. 92().
112

For discussions of an important issue soon to reach the Supreme Court,
see Fred 0. Blue, "Has the Legislature the Power to Restrict the Sale of the
State's Natural Products Into Other States?", 90 C£NT. L. J. 154, and Thomas
Porter Hardman, "The Right of a State to Restrain the ExportatiOn of Its
Natural Resources", 26 W. VA. L. Q. l, 224.. 252 U. S. 399, 40' Sup. Ct. 378 (1920). The same point is affirmed in
Cincinnati, C. & E. Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 252 U. S. 4o8, 40 Sup. Ct. 381 (1920).
See 18 MICH. L. Rr:v. 791. ·
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complexion and that to comply with the Kentucky law the company
would have to attach an extra car for the six-mile journey in Kentucky. As not over six per cent. of the passengers were colored and
on many trips there were no colored passengers at all, the attachment
of this extra car was thought to be an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce .both in respect to cost and in the practical operation
of the traffic. For the majority Mr. Justice McKenna declared that
"the regulation of the act affects interstate business incidentally and
does not subject it to unreasonable demands." He also relied on the
fact that the Kentucky part of the line was separately owned by a
Kentucky corporation which, he said, should not be permitted to
escape its obligations to the state ·by running its coaches beyond the
state line. But Mr. Justice Day answered that this Kentucky company owned no cars and conducted no operations and that its stock
was entirely owned by the defendant company whose business was
preponderantly interstate. Mr. Justice McKenna, for the majority,
spoke of "the equal necessity, under our system of government, to
preserve the powers of the states within their sovereignties as to
prevent the power from intrusive exercise within the national sovereignty," but he did not mention a regard for certain strongly-held
sentiments which may have influenced the favor shown to the state.
It would not be safe to rely on the case as authority for equally great
burdens imposed from other motives.M

3. State Taa-ation and Interstate Commerce
The recently developed doctrine that the inclusion of extra-territorial values in the assessment of an excise on the local business of
foreign corporations doing both local and interstate commerce makes
the exaction an invalid regulation of interstate commerce and a
taking of property without due process of law finds expression in
Wallace v. Hines. 55 _The case.sustained a preliminary injunction
against a North Dakota excise imposed by a statute under which
"' For other discussions of state police power in relation to interstate
commerce, see Kenneth F. Burgess, "New Limitations Upon State Regulations
of Rates'', 20 Cor.m.r. L. Rsv. fi6o, Julius Henry Cohen. ''The New York
Harbor Problem in Its Legal Aspects", 5 CoRNSI.L L. Q. 373, and notes in 33
HARv. L. Rl;:v. 292, 312, on state control over interstate bridges.
.. 253 U. S._-, 40 Sup. Ct. 435 (1920).
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"the tax commissioner fixes the value of the total property of each
railroad by the total value of its stocks and bonds and assesses the
proporti~n of this value that the main track mileage in North Dakota
bears to the main track of the whole line.'' The mileage ratio was
declared indefensible ·both because the physical value of a mile of
track over the North Dakota plains is wQrth less than that of a mile
in more mountainous and more populous states and because the road
in question had valuable terminals and other property in other states
with no corresponding assets and facilities in North Dakota. Mr.
Justice Holmes puts t~e principle of the case as follows:
"The only reason for allowing a State to look beyond its
borders when it taxes the property of for~ign corporations is
that it may get the true value of the things within it, when they
are part of an organic system of wide extent, that gives them a
value above what they otherwise would possess. The purpose
is not to expose the heel of the system to a mortal dart-not, in
other words, to open to ~ation what is not within the State.
Therefore no.property of such an interstate road situated elsewhere can· be taken into account unless it can be seen in some
plain and fairly intelligible way that it adds to the value of the
road and the rights exercised in the State. Hence the possession of bonds secured by mortgage of lands in other States, or
of a land-grant in another State or of other property that adds
to the riches of the corporation but does not affect the North
Dakota part of the road is no sufficient ground for the increase
of the tax-whatever it may be-whether a tax on property, or,
as here: an excise upon doing business in the State."
Two divergent cases on occupation taxes imposed on those selling within 'the state goods of extra-state origin still in the original
package show how fine a line can be drawn between vice and virtue.
Wagner v. Covingtonn 6. presented the familiar distinction between
sales by peddlers and sales by drummers. An Ohio bottler of soft
drinks with a regular line of customers in Covington, Kentucky, was
subjected to a license tax on wholesalers. Some of his deliveries
were in response to previous specific orders. For these the Kentucky court had held him not taxable. The rest were the result of
.,251 U.S. 95, 40 Sup. Ct. 93 (1919). See 6 VA. L. ~. 378.
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fairly assured expectancies, but occasionally the wagons returned
from Kentucky to Ohio with some or all of the goods they had taken
over to meet the hoped-for demand. Over the silent dissent of. Justices McKenna and Holmes, Mr. Justice Pitney for the majority
declared:
"Of course the transportation of plaintiffs' goods across the
state line is of itself interstate commerce; but it is not this that
is taxed by the city of Covington, nor is such commerce a part
of the business that is taxed, or anything more than a prepara. tion for it. So far as the itinerant vending is concerned, the
goods might just as well have been manufactured within the
state of Kentucky ; to the extent that plaintiffs dispose of their
goods in that kind of sales, they make them the subject of local
commerce; and, this being so, they can claim no immunity from
local regulation, whether the goods remain in the original packages or not."
1

The previous peddler cases sustaining taxes on sales of goods
which, so far as appears, were still in the original packages in which
they came from other stat.es, make us curious to know why.Justices
McKenna and Holmes dissented. The provisions of the ordinance
are not set forth in the majority opinion, and it may be that the dissentients did not agree that its general language was properly separable into an invalid tax on concededly interstate sales and a valid
tax on those made in Kentucky without prior assured orders. Or
they may have thought that the regular and continuous business of
supplying the recurring and fairly certain demands of retailers is
substantially different from the casual and precarious peddling heretofore held not interstate commerce.
That it was the itinerant character of the vending that put it within the grasp of the state seems fairly clear from the unanimous
decision in Askren v. {:ontinental Oil Co.51 four months later. This
held a state license tax inapplicable to sales of gasoline in the barrels
in which they had come from another state and to sales of the whole
contents of tank cars. Mr. Justice Day, after citing an earlier d.ecision,58 declared :
U. S. 444. 40 Sup. Ct. 355 (1920) •
.. Standard Oil Co. v. Graves, 249 U. S. 38g, 39 Sup. Ct. 320 (1919).

rr .2,52
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"In that case we reaffirmed, what had often been adjudicated
heretofore in this court, that the direct and necessary effe~ of
such legislation was to impose a burden upon interstate commerce; that under the federal Constitution the importer of such
pro<;l.ucts from another state into his own state for sale in the
.original packages, had a right to sell_ the same in such packages
·without being taxed for the privilege by taxation of the sort here
:involved. Upon this branch of the case we deem it only neces.sary to refer to that case, and the cases therein cited, as establishing the proposition that the license tax upon the sale of gasoline brought into the state in tank cars, or original packages, and
thus sold, is beyond the power of the state."
different attitude was taken towards that part of the business
which was said to consist "in selling gasoline in quantities to suit
_purchasers." Of such sales Mr. Justice Day said:
"Much is made of the fact that New Mexico does not produce
gasoline, and all of it th~t is dealt in within that state must be
brought in from other states. But, so long as there is no dis.:
crimination against the products of another state, and none
is shown from the mere fact that the gasoline is produced in
another state, the gasoline thus stored and dealt in is not
beyond the taxing power of the state."
_A

·The best reason for allowing the taxation of these sales would
.seem to be that the original package was broken to make theni. But
that is not mentioned by the court. Instead Mr. Justice Day cites
Wagner v. Covingto1i59 without comment. ';rhe sales there held taxable were in the original packages. Why should the sale of a full
case of ginger a1e be held taxable and the sale of a full barrel of
gasoline be held not taxable? The only substantial difference between the cases seems to be that the ginger ale was peddled while
presumably the purchaser of the gasoline had to come and get it.
In Shaffer v. Carter6° an Illinois citizen based one of his objections
"Note 56, supra.
.
U.S. 37, 40 Sup. Ct. 22I (x920). This case will be reviewed more
·at length in the section on "Taxation", and references to discussions in law
reviews will there be given. Mr. Justice McReynolds dissented but, as he filed
no opinion, it cannot be known whether his dissent is based on the commerce
.clause or on the Fourteenth Amendment or on both.
.. 252
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to an Oklahoma tax on the net income from his Oklahoma oil wells
on the ground that the. tax was an invalid regulation of interstate
commerce. Mr. Justice Pitney answered that the tax since it was
not on gross receipts but only upon the net proceeds "is plainly sustainable, even if it includes net gains from interstate commerce."
For this he cited the case81 sustaining the application of the Wis~onsin income tax to the net income of a domestic corporation from
business within the state. He thus inakes it evident that the doctrine
of that case is not confined to domestic corporations or to domiciled
citizens. Whether it applies only to ge:µeral state-wide income taxes
or covers as ~ell as a special excise on net incomes confined to corporations is a question now before the Supreme Court in cases contesting the corporation income tax law of Connecticut82
THOMAS

Rt:en Pow:er.r..

Columbia 'f!niversity.
(To be continued)
01

United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321, 38 Sup. Ct.
399 (1918).
a For discussions of the Connecticut decision sustaining the tax, see 20
Coi:.UM:. L. Ri;:v. 324 and 33 H.\R.v. L. Rtv. 736.

